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All changed – changed utterly 
President-elect Barak Obama’s mandate for the US Presidency was predicated on one 
simple word – ‘Change’.  The simplicity of the word, and of his campaign slogan – 
‘Yes We Can’ – belies the complex task of managing change within a dynamic and 
turbulent fiscal and security environment.  Only time will tell whether or not President 
Obama and his cabinet have the individual and collective skill-sets required to deal 
with the challenges for change that confront them. 
 
Closer to home, the Irish government is also confronted with radical change as it 
applies to the domestic and international fiscal environment.  The Irish banking and 
financial services sector along with construction and property development have 
proven especially vulnerable in the current global credit crisis.  Amid rising 
unemployment and shrinking revenue receipts, the main focus of the electorate to date 
has been on the ability of the government to demonstrate clear and decisive leadership 
– the ability to confront the crisis, manage change and drive the necessary structural 
and institutional transformations required for renewed prosperity and growth. 
 
In this context, the Irish public service finds itself the subject of some hostile scrutiny 
of late with some commentators branding it variously as ‘overstaffed’ or ‘bloated’ and 
‘highly resistant to change’.  Whilst these charges are unfounded as they apply to the 
public service in general, they are particularly wide of the mark as they apply to the 
Defence Forces.  Indeed, the Defence Forces might be seen as a model for best 
practice in the manner in which it has downsized and transformed itself to meet the 
unprecedented fiscal and security challenges that have arisen in the first decade of the 
21st century.   
 
Despite being an institution almost as old as the state itself, the Defence Forces has 
always been a fluid organisational entity – perhaps uniquely among state bodies - and 
has been subject to constant change and transformation since its inception.  During the 
1920s the organisation transformed itself from an irregular guerrilla force to a 
formally established and expanded Free State Army.  After a period of contraction 
during the 1930s, following the Civil War, Oglaigh na hEireann expanded once more 
in the 1940s directly as a consequence of the Second World War. 
 
Shrinking after the Emergency, the organisation again expanded briefly during the 
1970s in response to the ‘Troubles’.  The PDF’s most significant historical 
development during the post-war period came when the organisation was deployed 
overseas for the first time on UN peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions – 
roles which have proven to be the primary definers of the organisation in terms of 
public perceptions of it and its place within the national consciousness.  This UN 
service – undertaken by the ordinary men and women of the PDF – has in turn proven 
to be a primary definer of Ireland’s image abroad as a nation state.  The service and 
sacrifice of Irish soldiers abroad has contributed significantly to Ireland’s status as a 
world player diplomatically.  The political capital and foreign policy leverage that 
Irish military service overseas has generated should not be underestimated. 
  
Despite these changes during the 20th century – all as a result of external stimuli – the 
greatest transformation in the history of the Defence Forces in its history has, 
arguably, taken place during the first decade of the 21st century.  During this period, 
from 2000 to date, the Defence Forces has downsized and transformed itself in a 
series of rapid and profound paradigm shifts in organisational, strategic and tactical 
doctrine.  These fundamental changes have been driven by the professional core of the 
organisation – its commissioned officers – in order to effect the PDF’s integration into 
EU and NATO/PfP structures and in order to conform to major UN reform and 
tectonic shifts in the international security environment.  Despite these dramatic 
changes, many stakeholders and opinion leaders external to the organisation including 
politicians and academics – across the widest spectrum of Irish society - are not fully 
aware of their scope and significance. 
 
The specific primary drivers for this change within the Irish Defence Forces during 
the last decade include the 2000 White Paper on Defence, UN reform - principally by 
way of the Brahimi Report - Ireland’s membership of NATO/PfP, EU security and 
Defence developments and the pattern and growth of global terrorism.  Whilst these 
latest stimuli for change have been external to the organisation - the full repertoire of 
the PDF’s organisational responses have been evolved internally by military officers 
themselves.  Unlike many organisations in the private or public sector – who would 
rarely face such daunting challenges in any event – in this case, due to the collective 
expertise and leadership qualities of its officer corps, the state did not find it necessary 
to contract expensive external consultants or expert advisory groups in order to 
successfully reconfigure the PDF.   
 
The expertise and mobilisation for the current transformation has come almost 
exclusively from within the organisation itself.  For the taxpayer, this has represented 
a major cost benefit.  The Defence Forces are probably the first cohort within the 
public service to achieve such major organic change – concurrent with exponential 
growth in levels of service provision - with no net increase in cost to the public purse.  
The result has been the successful overhaul and enhancement of a vital public service 
with no interruption to an ever-expanding suite of military commitments – in a cost 
neutral manner.  These dramatic changes have been facilitated in no small way by the 
contribution of RACO who have been instrumental in maintaining coherence, 
relevance, fairness and value for money to the change agenda.   
 
The way in which the PDF has managed its own recent transformation provides a 
template for best practice for change management for the remainder of the public 
service – and by extension the wider private sector.  Indeed organisations as diverse 
as the HSE or Aer Lingus might take note of the way in which the PDF have 
reconfigured themselves of late to meet growing service level demands and to 
promote excellence at all levels of the organisation in a challenging and unforgiving 
environment.  
 
Quantitatively, the impact of the change agenda on the day to day operations and 
capabilities of the PDF have been dramatic.  The UN’s Report of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations, (2000) - known as the Brahimi Report – made many 
recommendations on mandates for UN missions, rules of engagement and force 
capability.  Consistent with parallel developments within the US military – 
particularly the post-Cold War US ‘Defence Capability Initiative’ (DCI) programme – 
and NATO’s move from the strategic doctrine of massed formations toward NATO 
Reaction Forces (NRFs), the Brahimi report’s recommendations effectively 
necessitate the creation of a system of international rapid reaction forces configured in 
Brigade sized formations to be known as Battlegroups.  Such rapid reaction forces or 
Battlegroups – as implied by the Brahimi report – would be of optimal value to the 
UN if available on a continuous standby footing and on a regional or subsidiary basis.   
 
The UN - mindful of its inability to act meaningfully to prevent genocide in Rwanda 
in 1994 or in Srebrenica in the former Yugoslavia in 1995 – required an urgent 
response for its requirement for regional, subsidiary formations or ‘oven ready’ 
Battlegroups for global crises. For the PDF to move towards this model of 
mobilisation – deployable at short notice and ready to engage in combat operations or 
peace enforcement duties as part of a UN-mandated regional military Battlegroup – 
was consistent with the Irish Government’s 2000 White Paper stated aim of ensuring 
that ‘Ireland has a world class military organisation to enable to Defence Forces to 
meet the requirements of Government in the changing national and international 
sphere’.  The political challenges for such collaboration however were significant.  
Apart from the training, doctrinal or even logistics challenges associated with such a 
change in modus operandi for the PDF - Ireland’s participation in any regional 
Battlegroup would also have to be consistent with Ireland’s policy of neutrality and 
the ‘triple lock’ mechanism for UN, Government and Dail approval for the 
deployment of Irish troops overseas.  
 
Despite these challenges and principally due to the efforts of the military authorities, 
by January 2008, Ireland was in a position to contribute troops to the Nordic Battle 
Group and successfully completed all of the necessary training and liaison for a six 
month tour of duty with the NBG which concluded in June of 2008.  In addition, the 
PDF successfully participated in a number of UN mandated EU led peace 
enforcement missions such as EUFOR’s mission to Bosnia Herzegovina and more 
recently the UN-mandated EUFOR Chad-CAR mission to Chad.   In addition to the 
influence of Irish troops in a ‘boots on the ground’ capacity at the Force level in Chad 
itself, the PDF have also achieved a significant footprint at Operational Headquarters 
level at Mont Valerian in Paris with the appointment of Lt Gen Pat Nash as 
Operational Commander of EUFOR Chad-Car.  
 
Along with the cohort of Irish officers present at senior levels in Paris, the PDF have 
also managed to gain and maintain a significant and highly influential foothold at 
EUMS in Brussels.  By being directly involved in the planning and shaping of EU 
missions and interventions abroad, officers of the PDF have made an invaluable 
contribution to the military and political influence, directly and indirectly that Ireland 
can wield in Europe.  By being involved at EUMS, Irish officers have brought a 
unique and pro-social influence to bear on our EU counterparts at the level of the 
EUMS, the EU Military Committee, the EU Political and Security Committee and by 
extension the EU Council of Ministers.  Aside from the quantitative differences to 
PDF operations that EU involvement have brought about, our integration into EU 
structures has made a vital qualitative difference to the political influence that the 
Irish government can bring to bear on EU foreign policy matters.  In short, in my view 
the PDF’s involvement at EU level has allowed Ireland to give meaningful expression 
– perhaps for the first time in the history of the state – to our military neutrality in 
terms of the influence Irish officers can bring to bear on the nature and scope of EU 
military interventions and in terms of the political traction that such involvement 
provides.  The political capital and foreign policy leverage that contemporary Irish 
military service at the EU has generated should not be underestimated.       
 
In parallel with these developments, the PDF continued to shoulder its workload with 
regard to more robustly configured and rapidly deployed ‘blue-helmet’ UN missions.  
The PDF deployment to Liberia in 2003 was a prime example of this ongoing 
commitment with a force of 400 Irish successfully deployed to Monrovia within 2 
months of the initial reconnaissance by PDF personnel.  The Irish participation as 
UNMIL’s Quick Reaction Force was completely successful – despite the volatile 
nature of the political and security situation in Liberia and the robust nature of the UN 
mandate there.  
 
It is worth noting here – once more - that this successful deployment took place 
during a period of readjustment and re-calibration of the PDF towards the model of 
rapid mobilisation envisaged by Brahimi and Kofi Anan at the beginning of the 
decade.  It also took place concurrent with the remarkably successful integration of 
senior officers of the PDF into the highest levels of a newly configured and rapidly 
emergent EUMS.  In a remarkably short space of time, the PDF had gone from being 
peacekeepers primarily contracted to one international agency – the UN – to one of 
rapidly deployable peace enforcers, with multidisciplinary specialties contracting 
successfully to a variety of international agencies including the UN, the EU and 
NATO/PfP.  It would be difficult, if not impossible to highlight any other Irish public 
or private enterprise whose roles have expanded as significantly in such a short period 
of time and with the same level of operational effectiveness and emphasis on 
excellence as maintained by the PDF. 
 
The parallel integration of PDF personnel into NATO/PfP structures during this 
period has been both seamless and remarkably successful given the rate and pace of 
organisational change undertaken by the organisation in terms of its concurrent 
integration into EU military structures.  Senior officers of the PDF have integrated 
well into their NATO/PfP roles at SHAPE, NATO Headquarters in Brussels and in 
UN mandated, NATO led operations in the field.  Aside from the outstanding 
collective contributions made by PDF personnel to NATO peace enforcement 
missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan – individual officers such as Brigadier General 
Gerry Hegarty have proven that Irish officers are capable of the most complex 
leadership tasks within NATO at the highest levels of that organisation. 
 
For officers, the primary professional cadre within Ireland’s defence establishment, 
the cumulative net effects of this change have been significant.  Due to increasing 
overseas commitments, the tempo of foreign assignments for officers has increased 
exponentially.  For example, at time of writing, 25% of officers at the rank of Lt Col 
are serving overseas at any one time.  This operational tempo is exacerbated for all 
officers by the amount of time – averaging 15 years over the service life of an officer 
– of de-facto Monday to Friday separation from families arising from residential 
duties, military courses and appointments to military installations throughout the state 
itself.  The highly mobile, flexible and multi-tasked nature of service life as a 
professional officer in the PDF – whilst it matches those prescriptions for excellence 
contained within management and leadership textbooks – extracts a heavy toll from 
the family lives of serving officers. 
 
Despite these many challenges, the officer corps – like the organisation itself - is 
successfully transforming itself by a process of reflective professionalism facilitated 
by the MA in Leadership Studies co-hosted by the Command and Staff School of the 
Military College and NUI Maynooth. Any future White Paper on Defence would do 
well to recognise the value of this core group of professionals and their unique 
contribution as senior public servants to the unprecedented levels of change and value 
for money achieved within the Irish defence sector.  It would be a retrograde and 
illogical step to reduce or in any way diminish by way of status or numbers this core 
group of professionals – central to the successful facilitation of change or the required 
rapid expansion of the PDF in any future man-made or natural crisis. 
 
At a time of much discussion on the nature of change and the new fiscal and security 
challenges that confront Ireland domestically and internationally – the PDF surely 
represents a case study in best practice in transformation and change.  This quiet 
revolution within the PDF has taken place in a largely cost-neutral manner.  Indeed 
over the last 10 years or so, the numbers of personnel serving in the defence forces 
has dropped by almost 20%.  The leaner, fitter, modernised PDF is poised to continue 
its proud tradition of public service both at home and on the international stage.  The 
recent seismic developments in terms of the PDF’s integration as neutrals into EU and 
NATO/PfP structures – as explicitly required by the UN – will ensure that Ireland 
continues to gain military and political traction at international levels commensurate 
with a nation ‘boxing far above its weight’.  The political influence and positive 
perceptions of Ireland internationally generated by such military service should not be 
underestimated.  Any reduction in the numbers of officers contained in any future 
White Paper on Defence – or any diminution in their status as the core professional 
group in Ireland’s defence establishment - would represent a retrograde step not just 
for the PDF but for Ireland itself.  In addition, any attempt to seek security opt-outs – 
as a knee jerk political response to fallacious assertions about Ireland’s neutral status 
circulated by the ‘No’ campaign - in any future referendum on Lisbon would be 
equally misguided and would undo in one fell stroke all of the dramatic and positive 
changes of the last decade. 
 
Dr. Tom Clonan (Captain Retired) is the Irish Times Security Analyst.  He lectures in 




   
  
 
 
